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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
CONSOLIDATION. The debtor filed a Chapter 11 case
in 1990 and the debtor’s wholly-owned farm corporation
filed for Chapter 11 in 1992. The debtor moved for
substantive consolidation of the cases. The court held that
consolidation was untimely because no evidence was
available to determine the effect on the creditors in each
case. In re Stevenson, 153 B.R. 52 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03.*
HOMESTEAD. The debtors owned two neighboring
buildings which they rented as four apartments and used the
fifth apartment as their residence. The court held that the
debtors could claim a homestead exemption only as to the
portion of the buildings used as their personal residence. In
re Wierschem, 152 B.R. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
LIFE INSURANCE. The debtor was the surviving
spouse of a person who had five life insurance policies, all
of which named the surviving spouse as beneficiary; two
had been assigned to the surviving spouse by the decedent,
two were owned by the decedent and one was owned by the
decedent's corporation. The court held that under N.Y. Ins.
Law § 3212(b), the proceeds of the policies assigned to the
surviving spouse were exempt but the other policies were
not exempt. In re Rundlett, 153 B.R. 126 (S.D. N.Y.
1993), aff’g, 142 B.R. 649 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1992).
TAX REFUND. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, the
IRS held $12,000 of excess taxes owed to the debtors as a
refund. The debtors claimed that the refund was exempt
under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 513.427 because the refund was not
subject to attachment. The court held that under I.R.C. §
6402, the refund was subject to attachment in specific
instances, although not by any current creditor of the
debtors; therefore, the refund was not eligible for the
exemption. In re Robinson, 152 B.R. 956 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1993).
The debtor sought to exempt as wages federal and state
income tax refunds resulting from taxes withheld from the
debtor’s wages during the 90 days prior to filing for
bankruptcy. The court held that the refunds were not
“wages” for purposes of the exemption statute, Okla. Stat.
tit. 31 § 1(A)(18). In re Miles, 153 B.R. 72 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1993).
WILD CARD. The debtor’s fax machine, copier, office
desk and chair, and file cabinet used in the debtor’s business
were eligible for the tools of the trade exemption to the
extent of the dollar limit of that exemption, with any excess
amount eligible for the “wild card” exemption. The debtor’s
bank account was not eligible for the tools of the trade
exemption and was not eligible for the “wild card”
exemption. In re King, 153 B.R. 229 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1993).
    CHAPTER 12
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[8][c].* The Chapter 12 plan
was not confirmed where the plan failed to include (1)
payment of trustee fees on impaired claims paid by the
debtor directly, (2) a source of operating funds for restarting
the debtor’s dairy and livestock operations, and (3) several
expense items. In re Oster, 152 B.R. 960 (Bankr. D. N.D.
1993).
Although the debtor’s spouse did not join in the
bankruptcy case, the debtor’s plan included the spouse’s
nonfarm income in the amount of  income available to meet
farm expenses. A creditor objected to the plan, arguing that
the nondebtor spouse’s income is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the spouse cannot
be legally forced to contribute to the debtor’s plan
payments. The court held that the plan would be confirmed.
The court noted that the court is also powerless to force the
debtor to make plan payments; therefore, the court’s
inability to force the debtor’s spouse to contribute income to
the plan payments did not affect the confirmability of the
plan.  In both cases, the result of a failure to pay would be a
default under the plan with the only remedy being denial of
discharge.  In re Soper, 152 B.R. 985 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1993).
The Chapter 12 debtor’s plan provided that stock in a
Farm Credit Bank would be transferred to the bank in partial
satisfaction of a secured claim of the bank. The bank
objected to the plan, arguing that the stock could not be
redeemed without permission of the bank. The court held
that Section 1225(a)(5)(C) has precedence over the Farm
Credit Bank regulations and that the redemption of the stock
could be required by the plan. In re Davenport, 153 B.R.
551 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993).
TRUSTEE FEES-ALM § 13.03[8][b].* The debtor’s
Chapter 12 plan was confirmed in 1989 and included a
trustee fee of 6 percent. The trustee sought an increase in the
fee to 10 percent in 1992 after the statutory fee was
increased by order of the U.S. Attorney General. The court
held that the fee could not be increased because (1) the
trustee had not demonstrated that the debtor could make the
payments with the increase in fees, (2) the trustee failed to
show that the modification of the fee was proper, and (3) the
confirmed plan was res judicata as to the trustee fee. In re
Roesner, 153 B.R. 328 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
ATTORNEY’S FEES. Although the court held that the
IRS was not deemed to have waived sovereign immunity for
purposes of awarding attorney’s fees and costs resulting
from repeated violations of the discharge order, the court
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allowed such awards under I.R.C. § 7430. In re Germine,
152 B.R. 619 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993).
The court held that penalty amounts assessed by the IRS
against the debtor for late payment of nondischargeable
taxes were also nondischargeable because the penalty was
not related to a pecuniary loss of the IRS. In re Hallock, 93-
1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,315 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtors originally filed a Chapter 13
case in which claims for priority and nonpriority taxes were
filed. The debtors converted the case to Chapter 7 before
completing the Chapter 13 plan and before obtaining
discharge of the nonpriority taxes. The court held that the
debtors remained personally liable for the nonpriority taxes
and for post-petition interest and penalties on those taxes. In
re Quick, 152 B.R. 902 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992).
In a subsequent opinion in the above case, the court held
that the IRS could not include penalties for failure to pay on
the pre-petition nonpriority tax claims for the period during
the Chapter 13 case. In re Quick, 152 B.R. 909 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1992).
The court held that the debtor’s 1984 and 1985 taxes
were nondischargeable because the returns were not filed.
The court also held that the debtor’s testimony that the
returns were mailed was insufficient proof of the filing.
Matter of Harper, 153 B.R. 84 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
The IRS assessed the debtor for 1982 through 1986 taxes
on April 11, 1990.  The debtor then filed a Chapter 13 case
which was dismissed on February 20, 1991.  The debtor
refiled for Chapter 13 on April 11, 1991, more than 240
days after the assessment, and sought a determination that
the taxes were dischargeable under Section 523(a)(1)(A).
The court held that the 240 day rule was tolled by the filing
of the first Chapter 13 case plus six months after the case
was dismissed. In re Richards, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,344 (10th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,330 (W.D. Okla. 1992).
JURISDICTION. The Bankruptcy Court abstained
from determining the debtor’s tax claim because the estate
had no funds to pay the taxes and the debtor was pursuing
administrative appeal  of the tax claim. In re Hemaya, 153
B.R. 71 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFER-ALM § 13.03[4].*
Within 90 days before the debtor filed for Chapter 7, the
IRS levied against the debtor’s wages for payment of taxes
which were nondischargeable in the bankruptcy case. The
debtor sought recovery of the levied funds as a preferential
transfer while the debtor was insolvent. The court held that
the levied funds were recoverable to the extent the debtor
could claim an exemption for the wages. In re Williams,
153 B.R. 74 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1992).
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The debtor was allowed
to carry back post-petition, pre-confirmation losses to pre-
petition tax years with any resulting refunds passing to the
bankruptcy estate. In re Maley, 152 B.R. 789 (Bankr.
W.D. N.Y. 1992).
The debtor was a corporation and moved to prevent any
sales of its stock which would disqualify, under I.R.C. §
382(a), the debtor from using net operating loss (NOL)
carryforwards. The court held that because the NOL’s were
estate property, any sale of stock by shareholders which
would affect the use of the NOL’s would violate the
automatic stay. In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 152 B.R. 924
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON. The debtors were a junior
vice-president and personnel director in a family corporation
which operated a security business. Neither debtor had
control over corporate finances, responsibilities which
included payment of the taxes, or control over the corporate
books. The court held neither debtor was a responsible
person liable for the 100 percent penalty under I.R.C. §
6672 for the corporation’s failure to pay withheld
employment taxes. In re Dallas, 153 B.R. 76 (Bankr. S.D.
Ala. 1992).
The debtor was controller of a corporation which failed
to pay federal employment taxes. The court held that the
debtor was liable for the I.R.C. § 6672 100 percent penalty
as a responsible person because the debtor was responsible
for payment of employment checks, had knowledge of the
unpaid taxes, and had the authority to make priorities among
the payments to the corporation’s creditors. In re Bourque,
153 B.R. 87 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
The debtor was a director and officer of a corporation
which failed to pay federal employment taxes. The debtor
had purchased the business for the debtor’s daughter who
managed the day-to-day operations of the company,
including payment of all business obligations. The court
held that the debtor was a statutorily responsible person
liable for the 100 percent penalty of I.R.C. § 6672 because
the debtor was a director and officer and had check writing
authority. In re Fontenot, 153 B.R. 165 (Bankr. W.D. La.
1993).
RETURNS. The bankruptcy trustee had filed federal
income tax returns for the estate and had requested an IRS
prompt determination. The IRS gave written acceptance of
the returns, reserving the right to make assessments based
on errors or corrections. The IRS then assessed a penalty
against the debtor under I.R.C. § 6722 for failure to provide
W-2 forms to its employees. The trustee sought to avoid the
assessment and levy of the penalty as violating Section
505(b).  The Bankruptcy Court had held that the IRS
assessment and levy violated Section 505; however, the
District Court reversed because the penalty was not related
to the income tax returns filed by the trustee and was not
subject to the Section 505 prompt determination request. In
re Farm Loan Services, Inc., 153 B.R. 234 (W.D. Wis.
1992).
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The debtor’s residence was
sold by the Chapter 7 trustee and the trustee excluded the
gain on the sale from sale under I.R.C. § 121 because the
debtors were both over age 55. The court held that a
bankruptcy estate could not claim the exclusion under I.R.C.
§ 121. In re Mehr, 153 B.R. 430 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1993).
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.  After the debtors filed for
Chapter 13, the IRS levied against the debtor-spouse’s
wages. The IRS then filed a claim in the bankruptcy case for
the remaining taxes owed by the debtors. The debtors
sought recovery of the levied funds as estate property. The
IRS argued that the sovereign immunity was not waived
because the tax claim did not involve the levied funds. The
court held that the sovereign immunity was waived under
Section 106(a) because the IRS claim and recovery action
were related since the recovery action was a compulsory
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counterclaim to the IRS tax claim. In re Adams, 152 B.R.
1021 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993).
The debtor sought to recover as avoidable preference
payments, non-trust fund tax payments made within 90 days
before the bankruptcy filing. The IRS argued that the action
was barred by sovereign immunity.  The court held that the
preference action was a compulsory counterclaim to the IRS
claim for taxes and that the IRS sovereign immunity was
waived by 11 U.S.C. § 106(c). In re Pullman Const.
Indus., Inc., 153 B.R. 539 (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff’g, 142 B.R.
280 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
The IRS withheld the debtors’ tax refunds to offset tax
claims which were paid and discharged in the debtors’
Chapter 13 case. The debtors sought an award of attorney’s
fees incurred in recovering the refunds. The Bankruptcy
Court held that although the attorney’s fees were awardable
because the IRS had waived sovereign immunity, the
Bankruptcy Court could not award the fees because the
court was not a “court of the United States.” The court,
instead, referred the matter to the District Court for review
and implementation. In re Sneller, 153 B.R. 343 (Bankr.
M.D. Ala. 1993).
TAX LIEN. The debtor sought to avoid a federal tax
lien filed against property owned by the debtor and former
spouse as invalid because filed under the debtor’s former
married name. The court held that the debtor had no
standing to avoid the lien because Section 545 allowed only
a trustee the power to seek avoidance of statutory liens. In
re Goebel, 153 B.R. 593 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
CONTRACTS
NOVATION. The defendant entered into a contract
with the plaintiff’s assignor to sell the defendant’s cattle and
to care for the cattle until the cattle were sold as feeder
cattle. The cattle did not sell immediately and after a
substantial feed bill had accrued, the parties orally agreed
that 50 percent of the sale of the cattle as “fat cattle” would
be paid to the assignor. The actual feed bill exceeded 50
percent of the sale proceeds and the assignee sued for the
remainder owed. The defendant argued that the agreement
for 50 percent of the proceeds was a novation of the contract
and set the maximum which would be paid for the care of
the cattle. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to
show that the later agreement was not intended to set a
maximum amount to be paid for the feed but only changed
the method of payment and made an approximation of the
resulting feed bill. Production Credit Ass’n v. Alamo
Ranch Co., 989 F.2d 413 (10th Cir. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2][g].*  The
FmHA has issued interim regulations limiting the number of
writedowns and buyouts a borrower may receive. Generally,
a borrower with loans dated after January 6, 1988 has a
lifetime limit of either one writedown or one buydown, but a
writedown or buyout received from an application made
before November 28, 1990 does not count toward the limit.
58 Fed. Reg. 30102 (May 26, 1993).
The ASCS has issued proposed regulations governing
the settlement of debts owed to the ASCS. 58 Fed. Reg.
33029 (June 15, 1993).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.* The FCIC has
issued proposed regulations which provide for one crop
insurance policy for wheat, barley, flax, oats and rye with
some changes for each specific crop. 58 Fed. Reg. 32458
(June 10, 1993).
PEANUTS. The CCC has adopted as final the 1993
peanut crop national support level of $674.93 per short ton
for quota peanuts and $131.09 per short ton for additional
peanuts. The minimum CCC export sale price for additional
edible peanuts is $400 per short ton. 58 Fed. Reg. 33884
(June 22, 1993).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiff was injured
when a spray pump container of insect repellent leaked and
ignited. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer for failure to
warn and for breach of implied warranty. The court held that
the failure to warn action was preempted by FIFRA and that
the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support the implied
warranty claim. Levesque v. Miles, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 61
(D. N.H. 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES-ALM § 5.04[1].*
The decedent’s estate claimed deductions for administrative
expenses paid to a company to operate the decedent’s ranch
and extensive oil, gas and mineral properties. The
deductions were disallowed by the IRS as not meeting the
requirements of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a). The estate
argued that the regulations were invalid for impermissably
restricting the requirements of I.R.C. § 2053(c)(2). The
court held that the statute was ambiguous and that the
regulations were a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Hefner v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,138 (W.D.
Okla. 1993).
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
decedent’s will provided that 60 percent of the residuary
was to pass to organizations which were “tax exempt of
inheritance.” The will provided that the executor could
distribute the property to existing organizations or form a
new charitable organization. The IRS ruled that the bequest
was sufficiently specific in amount and purpose to qualify
for the charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9322025, Mar. 9,
1993.
DEDUCTIONS-ALM § 5.04.*  The trustees of a trust
claimed a deduction for the full cost of investment advice,
arguing that the investment advice was required in order for
the trustees to fulfill their fiduciary duty to make prudent
investments of trust property.  The Tax Court, however,
held that I.R.C. § 67 allowed a full deduction (i.e. not
limited to the excess of 2 percent of AGI) only for expenses
unique to trust administration.  Because the investment
advice was normal for any investment, the advice was not
unique to trusts and was subject to the 2 percent limitation.
The Tax Court also held that the trustees failed to prove that
the investment advice was required by state law. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the trustees’ lack of
investment experience made the investment advice
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necessary.  O'Neill v. Comm'r, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,332 (6th Cir. 1993), rev’g, 98 T.C. 227 (1992).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6] .* The decedent’s will bequeathed property in trust
to the decedent’s father with the remainder to pass to the
decedent’s siblings and their issue. The siblings disclaimed
a portion of their remainder interests, which allowed the
issue to also become first remainder holders. The executor
partitioned the trust for the father into six trusts, each with
one remainder beneficiary as created by the disclaimers. The
IRS ruled that the six trusts would be considered separate
trusts for GSTT purposes and would be eligible for the GST
exemption amount. Ltr. Rul. 9323027, Mar. 16, 1993.
GIFTS-ALM § 6.01.* The taxpayers made contributions
to a nonprofit club for the construction of a clubhouse. All
club members who make such a contribution will receive a
lifetime membership in the club subject to payment of
current fees and the club rules of conduct. The IRS ruled
that the contributions were gifts of present interests to the
other club members, valued using the life expectancy of the
members. Ltr. Rul. 9323020, Mar. 12, 1993.
GIFTS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF DEATH-ALM
§ 5.02[2].* The decedent had applied for an insurance
policy, designating the decedent as the owner on the
application. Before the policy was issued and the first
premium paid, the decedent filed an amended application
splitting the policy into two policies and naming the
decedent’s sons as owners of the policies. The decedent paid
the first two premiums and the policies were issued to the
sons. The IRS ruled that the decedent did not have any
incidents of ownership in the first policy before transferring
the policy to the sons; therefore, the transfer was not
included in the decedent’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9323002,
Feb. 24, 1993.
The decedent had established a revocable inter vivos
trust with the decedent as sole beneficiary. The trust allowed
the decedent to transfer irrevocable fractional interests in the
trust to third persons. The decedent transferred several
irrevocable fractional interests in the trust with a value of
$10,000 each during the two years before death. The court
ruled that the value of the transfers was included in the
decedent’s gross estate because the transfers represented
relinquishments of the decedent’s power over the trust
interests. The court distinguished this case from Est. of
Jalkut v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 675 (1990) in that the transferred
property was not removed from the trust. Est. of Kisling v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-262.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
taxpayer owned an IRA which had the taxpayer’s spouse as
primary survivor beneficiary. The taxpayer established an
irrevocable trust as the contingent survivor beneficiary. The
trust had the spouse as beneficiary and required annual
distribution of at least all of the income earned by the IRA
annually. The IRS ruled that (1) a disclaimer by the
surviving spouse, as primary beneficiary, of a portion of the
IRA would be effective and (2) the trust would be QTIP
eligible for the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9320015, Feb.
17, 1993.
The taxpayer created a revocable trust which was the
named remainder beneficiary of the taxpayer’s IRA. The
trust beneficiary was the taxpayer’s surviving spouse and
provided that the greater of (1) all annual income of the IRA
or (2) the annual distribution from the IRA based on the life
expectancy of the surviving spouse be distributed to the
beneficiary at least annually. The IRS ruled that the trust
would be QTIP eligible for the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul.
9321058, Feb. 26, 1993.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, established three
revocable trusts with the surviving spouse as income
beneficiary and other individuals as remainder beneficiaries.
The trust agreements were apparently drawn from a living
trust “kit” and contained contradictory provisions. The IRS
ruled that the trusts contained ambiguous language and that
the trusts would not qualify for the marital deduction. Ltr.
Rul. 9323019, Mar. 12, 1993.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT-ALM § 5.02[5].* The
decedent’s will created two trusts, each with the surviving
spouse and a bank as cotrustees. The first trust provided that
the trustees had the discretion to accumulate income or to
distribute current and accumulated income to the surviving
spouse or to the decedent’s child and heirs. The second trust
provided that the trustees had the discretion to accumulate
income or to distribute income to the surviving spouse or to
distribute income and principal to the decedent’s daughter
or others for their comfort, support and education. The IRS
ruled that the surviving spouse did not have a general power
of appointment over the trusts because the state prohibited a
trustee from exercising discretionary powers for the
trustee’s benefit unless exercised pursuant to an
ascertainable standard. Ltr. Rul. 9323028, Mar. 16, 1993.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent’s estate included several interests in farm land.
The executor filed the estate’s Form 706 without a
completed special use valuation election. The “no” box was
checked on page 2 indicating no special use valuation
election was made and the protective election box was not
checked.  The return did not contain any statement that an
appraisal was pending at the time of the return. Citing Est.
of Gunland v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1453 (1987), the IRS ruled
that no protective election was filed.  Ltr. Rul. 9323004,
Mar. 4, 1993, aff’g on recon., Ltr. Rul. 9306006, Nov. 9,
1992.
TRUSTS-ALM Ch. 8. * The taxpayer transferred
residential property to two trusts, one with the taxpayer as
income beneficiary and one with the taxpayer’s spouse as
income beneficiary. The remainder of both trusts passed to
the surviving spouse with further remainders to the couple’s
children. Each trust could receive a pour over from the
probate estate of the initial beneficiary and each beneficiary
had a general power of appointment over trust corpus. If the
power of appointment is not exercised, the trustee of each
trust is authorized to transfer a portion of trust corpus equal
to the unused generation skipping transfer tax exemption to
a third trust with the surviving spouse as beneficiary and the
children as remainder beneficiaries. The trustee of the three
trusts may distribute trust corpus for the health, education or
support of the beneficiaries, except to the trustee if the
trustee is also a beneficiary. The taxpayer was the initial
trustee but the spouse had the power to remove the trustee
from the spouse’s trust and appoint a successor trustee. The
IRS ruled (1) the taxpayer would be treated as owner of the
trusts, including the third trust if the taxpayer survives the
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spouse; (2) the spouse would not be treated as the owner of
the spouse’s trust after the death of the taxpayer; (3) at the
taxpayer’s death, the basis of the trust assets in the
taxpayer’s trusts will equal the value of the assets for federal
estate tax purposes; (4) at the spouse’s death, the basis of
the trust assets in the spouse’s trusts will equal the value of
the assets for federal estate tax purposes; (5) if the residence
is sold during the taxpayer’s and spouse’s lifetimes, the sale
would be eligible for the Section 121 exclusion and Section
1034 nonrecognition of gain treatment; (6) the estate of the
first spouse to die may claim a marital deduction for the
remainder interest passing to the surviving spouse if a valid
QTIP election is made; (7) except to the extent the property
receives QTIP treatment, the surviving spouse’s interest in
the third trust and the decedent’s trust is not included in the
surviving spouse’s gross estate; (8) the transfer of the
residence to the taxpayer’s trust was not a completed gift
subject to gift tax unless the taxpayer exercises the general
power of appointment; and (9) the transfer of the interest in
the residence to the spouse’s trust was a taxable gift. Ltr.
Rul. 9321050, Feb. 25, 1993.
VALUATION-ALM § 5.02[3][a].* The pre-1990
shareholder agreement initially provided that upon the death
of a shareholder, the shareholder’s stock would be redeemed
for the proceeds of a life insurance policy plus a ten-year
promissory note at 10 percent interest. The agreement was
amended to provide for a 15-year note at an interest rate of 2
percent above the prime rate of a local bank. The IRS ruled
that the modification of the agreement did not subject the
stock to I.R.C. § 2703 valuation rules. Ltr. Rul. 9322035,
Mar. 10, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The taxpayer had
net operating losses (NOL) for 1985 through 1988 and
reported no alternative minimum tax (AMT) for 1985
because the taxpayer had no “economic income” for 1985
through 1988. The IRS ruled that the calculation of
alternative minimum tax net operating losses for each
taxable year is made in the same manner as regular NOL
except (1) items of tax preference arising in a taxable year
are added back to taxable income and (2) for individuals,
only those itemized deductions allowable in computing
alternative minimum taxable income are taken into account.
Ltr. Rul. 9321003, Feb. 10, 1993.
The taxpayer requested a ruling as to how to calculate
the allowable charitable deduction for purposes of
determining alternative minimum tax. The IRS ruled that the
charitable deduction limitation for AMT purposes is
calculated separately using alternative minimum taxable
income, with any disallowed charitable deduction carried
forward for use in calculating AMT in future years. Ltr.
Rul. 9321063, Mar. 2, 1993.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION .  The taxpayers granted
to a nonprofit organization a scenic easement over a portion
of their property which restricted the development of the
property.  The IRS denied the charitable deduction for the
value of the easement, arguing that the taxpayers lacked
donative intent in that the easement was granted in order to
enhance the value of their property and to obtain the tax
deduction and the transfer was without an exclusive
conservation purpose.  The court held that the transfer had
an exclusive conservation purpose because the easement
was granted to an organization devoted to conserving the
property.  The court also found that the transfers had the
requisite donative intent in that the granting of the easement
reduced the fair market value of the property.  McLennan
v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,345 (Fed. Cir.
1993), aff’g, 23 Cls. Ct. 99 (1991) and 24 Cls. Ct. 102
(1991).
COOPERATIVES. The taxpayer corporation was ruled
to be operating on a cooperative basis where (1) the net
income was annually redistributed to patron/shareholders
based on each patron’s business with the corporation, (2) the
corporation did less than 50 percent of its business with
nonshareholders, and (3) all shareholders have one vote.
Ltr. Rul. 9322028, Mar. 9, 1993.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.04[1].* The
plaintiffs were partners in a business which leased
automobiles under 18 month leases. The plaintiffs argued
that under normal lease practice, the leases were actually for
18 months less one day; therefore, the leases were for less
than 50 percent of the three year useful life of the
automobiles. The court held that the lease language was
unambiguous; therefore, the leases were not for less than 50
percent of the useful life of the automobiles and the
automobiles were not eligible for investment tax credit
(ITC). The cash basis plaintiffs also leased some
automobiles for less than 18 months but paid less than 15
percent of the rent for expenses. The plaintiffs argued that
they had incurred deductible expenses as to the automobiles
during the first 12 months of the leases. The court held that
the automobiles were not eligible for ITC because the
plaintiffs had not paid more than 15 percent of the leases for
expenses for the automobiles. Frei v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,322 (D. Colo. 1993).
PARTNERSHIP-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The taxpayer
formed a limited liability company (LLC) using stock from
a wholly-owned corporation. The IRS ruled that the LLC
would be taxed as a partnership because (1) the LLC lacked
the corporate characteristic of continuity of life since the
state LLC law and the LLC agreement required the consent
of all members to continue the partnership after a
terminating event, and (2) the LLC lacked the corporate
characteristic of centralized management since the state
LLC law and the LLC agreement provided that management
of the company was vested in all of the members. Ltr. Rul.
9320045, Feb. 24, 1993.
TRANSFERS OF INTERESTS. The IRS has ruled that
a transfer of an interest in partnership profits in exchange
for services to the partnership is not a taxable event for the
partnership or partner except (1) if the profits interest relates
to a substantially certain and predictable stream of income
from partnership assets; (2) if within two years of receipt,
the partner transfers the interest; and (3) if the profits
interest is a limited partnership interest in a publicly traded
partnership. Rev. Proc. 93-27, I.R.B. 1993-24.
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RETURNS. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
governing the reporting of transactions involving more than
$10,000. 58 Fed. Reg. 33763 (June 21, 1993).
SALE OR EXCHANGE. The taxpayers were brothers
who jointly owned a large tract of developed and
undeveloped land. Portions of this tract were sold to third
parties such that the single tract became separated into two
noncontiguous tracts. The taxpayers partitioned the
remaining property into separate ownership portions with
one taxpayer receiving cash to equalize the partition. The
IRS ruled that the partition was not a taxable sale or
exchange except to the extent the cash received by the one
taxpayer exceeded that taxpayer’s income tax basis of the
real property received. The allocation of basis must be based
on the property’s share of the total fair market value of the
partitioned property. Ltr. Rul. 9320037, Feb. 22, 1993.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
July 1993
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 3.95 3.91 3.89 3.88
110% AFR 4.35 4.30 4.28 4.26
120% AFR 4.74 4.69 4.66 4.64
Mid-term
AFR 5.54 5.47 5.43 5.41
110% AFR 6.11 6.02 5.98 5.95
120% AFR 6.67 6.56 6.51 6.47
Long-term
AFR 6.61 6.50 6.45 6.41
110% AFR 7.28 7.15 7.09 7.05
120% AFR 7.95 7.80 7.73 7.68
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX-ALM § 4.06[2].* The
taxpayer was a half owner and president of a family farm
corporation which raised breeder pigs. The taxpayer entered
into an employment contract with the corporation for annual
compensation of $6,000 in cash and 20 percent of all
butcher hogs at market weight. A bonus of up to 20 boars
weighting no more than 300 pounds could also be granted.
For 1990 the shareholder received $35,000 in hogs and in
1991 $41,000 in hogs but paid no FICA taxes on the value
of the hogs. The taxpayer’s share of market hogs was placed
in separate pens and delivered to market in partitioned
portions of trailers if the taxpayer’s hogs were delivered
with the corporation’s hogs. The taxpayer received a
separate check for the taxpayer’s hogs. The taxpayer
reimbursed the corporation for the costs of delivering the
taxpayer’s hogs. The IRS ruled that the efforts made by the
taxpayer to separate the transfer of the hogs to the taxpayer
as compensation were insufficient to change the true nature
of the transaction as payment of cash for services; therefore,
the transfers of the hogs were wages subject to FICA taxes.
Ltr. Rul. 9322003, Feb. 25, 1993. For an article on this
issue, see A.L.D. Vol. 3, No. 11 (May 22, 1992).
TAX LIENS. The IRS had filed tax liens against the
taxpayers’ residence which was the corpus of an Illinois
land trust with the taxpayers as beneficiaries. The court held
that under Illinois law, the taxpayers were treated as the
owners of the property; therefore, the tax liens could attach
to the property. United States v. Stamps, 93-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,280 (S.D. Ill. 1993).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
TRACTOR-ALM § 1.02[4].* The plaintiffs’ decedent
was killed when pinned under a tractor manufactured by the
defendant without roll-over protection (ROPS) or seat belts.
The plaintiffs sued in strict liability for defective design for
failure of the tractor to have ROPS. The plaintiff objected to
comments in the defendant’s closing arguments as to the
marketability of the tractor without ROPS. The court held
that the comments were allowable. The court also allowed
references to the conduct of the decedent in operating the
tractor as relevant to the causation of the accident, even
though contributory negligence was not a defense. Kolesar
v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 815 F. Supp. 818
(M.D. Pa. 1993).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS RULE-ALM §
13.01[4][a].* The plaintiff loaned $100,000 to an apple and
cherry producer and perfected a security interest in the apple
and cherry crops. The defendant also loaned the producer
$100,000 and perfected its security interest in the apple
crop. The producer delivered the apples to the defendant
who sold them and applied the proceeds to the defendant’s
$100,000 loan. The plaintiff sued for the proceeds of the
apple crop, claiming a prior lien on the crop. The defendant
argued that the federal farm products law prevented the
plaintiff from asserting its lien because the plaintiff failed to
provide written notice to the defendant of the lien on the
apples. The court held that because the defendant was a
lienholder, the federal farm products rule did not apply.
Food Services of America v. Royal Heights, 850 P.2d 585
(Wash. App. 1993).
GARNISHMENT. The plaintiff filed a garnishment to
collect on a judgment debt against the proceeds of milk
produced by the defendant. The defendant argued that the
milk proceeds were exempt from garnishment under N.D.
Cent. Code § 28-22-02 as a “crop.” The court held that
although milk is a farm product, it is not a crop eligible for
the exemption. Friedt v. Moseanko, 498 N.W.2d 129
(N.D. 1993).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
MILK. The plaintiff was a milk dealer which purchased
most of its milk from out-of-state producers. The plaintiff
challenged the constitutionality under the Commerce Clause
of a state pricing order which assessed milk dealers a
premium on all Class 1 milk sold in the state. The assessed
funds were distributed only to state producers; thus the
producers who supplied the plaintiff would not receive any
of the amounts assessed against the plaintiff. The court held
that the order was not discriminatory because all dealers
were assessed alike; therefore, the order would be evaluated
to determine whether the benefit to local producers
outweighed the burden on interstate commerce. The court
held that the order did not violate the Commerce Clause
because the incidental burden on interstate commerce was
outweighed by the benefit to the state’s dairy industry which
was in danger of collapse without the assessed funds. West
Lynn Creamery v. Comm’r of Dept. of Food, 611 N.E.2d
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239 (Mass. 1993). Our thanks to Francis DiLuna for alerting
us to this case.
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PESTICIDES . The defendant township passed an
ordinance which required a permit to apply pesticides by
aerial spraying. The plaintiff challenged the ordinance as
preempted by the state pesticide law. The township argued
that the statute expressly excepted zoning laws from the
preempted effect of the statute. The court held that the
ordinance was not an exempt zoning law because the focus
was on regulating aerial spraying and not land use.
Minnesota Agric. Aircraft Ass’n v. Township of
Mantrap, 498 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
Est. of Vissering v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 578 (10th Cir.
1993), rev’g and rem’g, 96 T.C. 749 (1991) (gross estate)
see p. 81 supra.
Langer v. Comm’r, 989 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1992),
aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1990-268 (home office) see p. 22 supra.
White v. Comm'r, 991 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1993),
aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1991-552 (partnership distributions),
see p.  99 supra.
Commissioner v. Keystone Consolidated Indus., Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2006 (1993), rev’g, 951 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1992)
(retirement plans), see p. 99 supra.
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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